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SUMMARY: This note examines how the concept of utility has led neo-classical economists astray. It first briefly reviews the 
thoughts of the early pioneers who have engaged these economists on the utility trail. It next scrutinizes the requirements imposed 
on the preference set of the consumer in view of extracting a utility function having anticipative properties. Then it shows how set 
theory can solve the dynamic exchange process and value determination without any need for a utility function. 
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1- INRODUCTION  
A conventional definition of “microeconomics” asserts that it is the “study of the behavior of individuals and firms in 
decision regarding the allocation of scare resources”. One could find other equally or more appropriate definitions 
such as “the study of the process of exchange” or “a search for a ‘metric’ of value”, etc. For, these definitions 
encapsulate ‘totus in toto’ the reasoning behind the choice of the paths that the early scholars of physio-mathematics 
followed to associate microeconomics to concepts such as “utility”, “value”, and “needs”. Today, the result of that 
effort appears scanty, while the utility trail is perceived as not only superfluous but somewhat damaging, for it has led 
neo-classical economists directly to a no- men’s land, where they remain trapped.    
The concept of utility may have originated mainly in the works of the physiocrats and their followers such as Condillac 
(1714-1780), Turgot (1727-1781), Condorcet (1743-1794), among others. For example, Condillac introduced the 
psychological basis of value and anticipated marginal utility, but his ideas were not followed by his contemporaries. 
Turgot for his part was more interested in the measurement of economic phenomena as a basis for rational 
administrations. And Condorcet emphasized social mathematics in view of constructing a science of society that would 
have objective value. While it is true to say that the physiocrats, in general, ignored the notion of ‘exchange-value’ in 
favor of ‘use-value’, as determined by the cost of production, but it is no exaggeration to point out that they are initially 
responsible for engaging neo-classical economists on the utility trail.   
Their immediate successors, known as the forerunners of the marginalists, followed them in the same trail in using 
the concept of utility, but cast in the analysis of the margin, to analyze specific questions. For example, Jeremy 
Bentham (1748-1832) gave the analysis of the margin a definite expression and associate it with “pleasure”. Jules 
Dupuit (1804-1866) used it to justify price discrimination. Augustin Cournot (1801-1877) and Heinrich von Thünen 
(1780-1850) developed the concept of marginal productivity. Bernoulli (1706-1782) made use of the concept of 
marginal increment of income, etc. Yet, these early developments were not fully appreciated before the mid-19th 
century because both physiocrats and forerunners, deep down, continued to associate the concept of utility to the 
inherent characteristic of commodities. And I believe that it is the reason why they were unable to distinguish ‘value-
in-use’ and ‘value-in-exchange’, also known as the diamond-water paradox enunciated by Adam Smith.  
Concepts of total and marginal utility received a more complete characterization from William Gossen (1810-1854). 
He brought back Condillac’s and Bentham’s idea, but added that the utility function must be concave; then as an 
economic agent acquires additional units of a particular good, each additional unit yields continuously diminishing 
“pleasure” up to a point of satiation. From then onward the act of consumption came to be associated with pleasure 
(sic). But even after Gossen’s addition, the concept of the margin was still not fully appreciated as a general tool of 
analysis until the early 1850s and beyond. That is, until the analyses of Jevons (1957), Léon Walras (1874a, 1874b), 
and Carl Menger (1870). These marginalists independently formulated a theory of exchange value based on the 
principle of diminishing marginal utility as opposed to the cost of production. Thus, all three accepted Bentham’s 
definition of a good as an object which brings pleasure. All three emphasized circumstances of things arising out of 
their relationship to an agent’s need rather than intrinsic characteristics of goods. For Walras, limitation begets rareté, 
and rareté begets value, even though he knew fully well that utility was not measurable. Nevertheless, he had reasoned 
that rareté is the cause of value in exchange, and until his death in 1912 he remained convinced that one day science 
would find a way to measure rareté as an absolute magnitude.  
Walras’ method was nevertheless severely criticized by scientists and mathematicians on the grounds that desire and 
needs were not susceptible to exact measurements. To counteract such criticisms, Pareto (1848-1923) explored the 
possibility that consumers’ behavior might be better examined without resorting to the notion that utility was a   
cardinally ‘measurable magnitude’. He then proposed the notion of indifference curves as an alternative for 
determining the allocation of income. John Hicks (1946) followed up on that development and is today credited with 
the so-called indifference map together with the curious notion of the marginal rate of substitution between pairs of 
goods. In essence, the contribution of Hicks is that individual demand curve could be derived from the indifference 
map and the constraint of the consumer’s budget. This means that the demand curve is not the same as declining 
marginal utility, which now appears as non- essential.  
All these early developments, in one form or another, constitute what is known today as the “Subjective Theory of 
Value” which asserts that a commodity’s or a service’s value is none other than the subjective value assigned to it by 
his consumer. That theory therefore rejects all notions of labor content and inherent properties that the commodity 
might have, and solves the diamond-water paradox. Yet today the notion of utility is still surreptitiously associated 
with pleasure, while the realization that marginal utility constantly falls until it is equal to the price of an item at least 
supports the belief that individual demand curves are downward sloping. But, as will be argued later, Hicks’ demand 
curve is arrived at through a questionable roundabout procedure.  
On a deeper level, these beliefs are pregnant with pathologies relative to the determination of exchange value as 
discussed in Sonnenschein (1973, 1974) and Mantel (1974). It suffices to consider the indifference map of Hicks and 
the so-called price-consumption curve (the loci of tangencies of indifference curves and price lines) out of which the 
demand curve is derived. To observe a point on that curve one must know prices. But prices are known only in 
equilibrium. Hence, a consumer is unable to derive another point, for there is no more price change in equilibrium. 
This means that only a single point of the demand can be observed during a given market period (Dominique, 2017). 
The same situation arises in the so-called Lagrange constrained utility maximization concept, which skips individual 
demand all together to differentiate a utility function so as to move directly to a constrained solution even though the 
so-called utility function remains unobservable.  
Today, modern economists live with a contradiction. On the one hand, they accept that value is determined by the 
market in equilibrium; that is, declining marginal utility is not the same as individual demand. On the other, subjective 
utility is maximized and inserted into the method of mechanics so as to determine value. Thus, after travelling for 
almost two hundred years on the subjective utility trail, they are still unable to provide an unambiguous metric for 
value, and still they remain steadfastly attached to the maximization of an elusive utility function. In the end, the 
subjective utility trail produces nothing of value except lots of irony from mathematicians and scientists.  
Erroneous conclusions such as linear demand curves, differentiation and maximization of utility, consumption equals 
pleasure, etc., could have been avoided had the early pioneers chosen instead a trail that led to scientific achievements. 
In that context, it is fair to say that the forerunners and marginalists may be forgiven for having lived before the advent 
of more appropriate tools of analysis. But the same cannot be said about their modern followers; i. e., Hicks, 
Samuelson, Debreu, among others, who could have oriented the profession toward set theory. For in the mid-19th 
century there was a renaissance in logic. George Cantor (1845-1918) had taken the idea of set to a higher level, and 
scholars such as Frege (1848-1925), Russel (1872-1970) and Whitehead (1841-1947) had completed the foundation 
of mathematical logic, which now stands as a corner stone of mathematics. Gotlob Frege in particular had by then 
demonstrated that one could use his formal system to resolve theoretical mathematical statements in terms of simpler 
logical notions. As already stressed above, many pathologies could have been avoided. Instead, the individual demand 
curve (sic) remains miss-specified and unobservable, while the association of consumption and pleasure carries 
negative consequences, such as insatiability of needs, addiction, rising consumer’s debt level, waste and environ-
mental degradation.   
The purpose of this note is to show how naïve set theory would have been a better tool to analyze the process of 
exchange and value determination. But beforehand, we examine some other utility-related requirements of the modern 
version of microeconomics; hoping that will underline the need to turn a page. 
2- SOME BIZARRE REQUIREMENTS  
Modern economists argue that there exists a universal consumption set C, and X ⊆ C represents a basket of goods 
selected by a given consumer. Then X ={x1, x2,…, xn} (with the x’s as elements) represents consumers’ preference. 
Since preference does not have a ‘metric’, economists agree since the 1930s that X is an ordinal space, equipped with 
an order R. They next posit that R must be complete, reflexive, continuous, transitive, monotone and convex. But this 
set of requirements imposed on R appears both stringent and somewhat redundant. Recall that X is an ordinal space 
equipped with a relation of order and equivalence. To say that X must be complete means that x1, x2, x3  X, either 
x1 ≾ x2 ˅ x2 ≾ x1. Thus, if any two elements x  X are comparable, then X must be a well-ordered set. If the ordering 
is strict, then R is automatically endowed with the properties of irreflexivity, antisymmetry and transitivity. If, on the 
other hand, the order is non-strict, then R is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive.  
As we will make more explicit in a moment, to be well-ordered a set must have a smallest element. Since there is no 
zero utility nor zero preference, both the set X and U (utility) are not well-ordered just like the real set (0, 1] is not. 
We will then assume that consumers with asymmetric and incomplete information sets and facing new and product 
differentiation cannot possibly well-order their preference sets. It is therefore reasonable to assume that X is a partially 
ordered set or a poset. In that case, the pair (X, ≾) satisfies reflexivity, antisymmetry, and transitivity; while the pair 
(X, ∽) satisfies reflexivity, symmetry, and transitivity. Thus if X is a poset, as it is reasonable to suppose, it is rather 
redundant for the modern version to require reflexivity and transitivity.   
Regarding the requirement of convexity, it is understood that if x1 ≻x2, then x2 ≤ [ x1 + (1- ) x2], where   (0, 1). 
I understand that this demand is to insure that the consumer will prefer more to less, but as we will make clear below, 
no multiplication is defined in ordinal space. There is no doubt that the average consumer prefers more to less, but 
this cannot be a necessary condition since it might not apply to some. Characteristics such as selfishness, monotonicity, 
etc. are subsumable in the consumer’s behavior. Indeed, the role of the scientist is to observe instead of imposing. In 
this sense, it is rather incongruous for scientists to impose characteristics on unobservable structure.  
Beside stringent demands and redundancies, there are other incongruities to be discussed below after we give formal 
definitions of the terms used in this study.  
2-1 Definition of Terms  
Terms and symbols used in the language of set theory vary with authors. For tractability, therefore, we begin by 
defining the terms used in this study:  
The Smallest Element: Let the pair (X, ≾) be a poset. Then an element x1  X is the smallest element in X if x1 ≾ x2, 
x2, x3, …, xn  X.  
A Binary relation R: A Binary relation R on a set X is: R ⊆ X x X. 
A Well-Ordered Set: The poset X is well-ordered if every non-empty subset of X contains a smallest element.  
A Partially Ordered Set (poset): A relation (≾) on a set X is a poset if it is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive.  
The Inverse of a Binary relation: If R is a partial order on a set X, then the inverse R-1 is a partial order on X.  
An Ordinal Space: is a set X = {x1, x2, …, xn} of distinct elements equipped with a relation of order and equivalence1.  
Isomorphism: Let (X, ≾x) and (Y, ≾y) be two posets that are isomorphically related. Then, there exists a one-to-one 
function f from X to Y such that ≾x y iff f (x) ≾y f (y), x  X.  
 
 
                                                          
1 Mathematical operations such as multiplication, addition, subtraction, differentiation, etc. are not defined on 
ordinal spaces. For a source, see Barsilai (2013).  
 
 
 
. 
 
Order Isomorphism: Let X and Y be two sets. An order isomorphism between X and Y preserves the largest, smallest, 
maximal, minimal elements, if they exist. Further, if X does not have a smallest element then the sets are not 
completely order-isomorphic2.   
3- THE PROCESS OF EXCHANGE  
With these definitions in mind, we can now examine other aspects of the modern version of neo-classical economics.  
The modern version at times emphasizes two models. Namely:  
                                                          f : X  ℝ+                                                                       (1) 
                                                         f : X  U,.and g : U  ℝ+,                                              (2)  
where, as before, X is an ordinal space, U is the utility index, another ordinal space, and ℝ is some real set. It should 
be noted first that if U is an ordinal space, then model (1) is in fact f: X  X = Ix, the identity function, which 
implies that the ordinal space X is simply ‘cardinalized’. Hence model (2) can be rewritten as:  
                                                                   h = (g ₀ Ix ) : X ℝ+,                                                  (3) 
where h is the composition of g and f. 
 Students of economics are taught that if preference satisfies certain conditions (see above), then there exists a utility 
function f such that x1≺ x2 implies f (x1) ≺ f (x2) without stating how that f is related to X. In (3), we find no such 
utility function, for as it can be seen in (3), h is no more a utility function nor a preference function. h is a monotone 
bijection with the ordinal space X as its domain and ℝ+ as its co-domain, or a mapping from a poset X to another ℝ. 
If both are ordered antisymmetrically, then they are isomorphically related3. However, the idea behind the mapping is 
to move X to a real set on which mathematical operations are defined. It would not make any sense to map X into a 
real set that is not pertinent to the problem of exchange. 
As shown in Dominique (2017), the only set of reals that will do the trick is the set of budget shares  ={1, 2 
,…,n}. Equation (3) can then be written as:  
                                                                           h = (g ₀ f): X                                                          (4)   
That real set offers various clues as to how to solve the exchange problem. Its elements appear in every pertinent 
equation of the system. To see how, we first consider how  enters the equilibrium equations of exchange with m 
                                                          
2 If the sets X and Y are isomorphically related, then f: X  Y is an injection; f -1: Y  X is a surjection. And both f 
and f-- 1 are strictly increasing. 
 
3 There are many proofs in the literature. For more, see: Warner (1965), Karolyi (2016), Simovici, et al. (2014), 
Roitman, (2013). See also: Wikibooks.org/Wiki/abstract-Algebra/Group-Theory/Homomorphism; retrieved on July 
9, 2017.  
consumers indexed by i and n goods indexed by j, and using superscript and subscript below to avoid double 
summations.  Within a small e > 0 radius, the equilibrium equation perceived by i is:  
                                                                   ij = (pj . xij (p)) / Bi (pj),                                               (5)  
where xij  (p) stands for good j purchased by consumer i, p is the market price, and Bi (p) stands for the budget of i. It 
is clear from (5) that price is a target variable, for if it is known then both quantity and budget will be known as well.  
Equation (4) is written in terms of X and , both are open sets, i. e., without smallest elements. Hence, the graph of 
h is not defined in the neighborhood of the origin. We will examine the consequence of that below. For now, it suffices 
to say that, as   ℝ, it is proper for economists to perform mathematical operations in it. Indeed, many such operations 
can be performed. For example, 
Operation 1: Operation 1 yields the nature of an individual demand curve as,  
                                                                             xij = ij Bi / pj.                                                              (6) 
Thus, near the equilibrium point, the individual demand curve is a rectangular hyperbola; its instantaneous price 
elasticity lies between -1 and 0; and both are derived from real values. If supply is fixed, we have:  
Operation 2: The excess demand of good j is:    
                                                                               pj .xij - ij Bi ≶ ξj,                                                        (7)  
where ξ is the excess demand of good j perceived by i. The summation over all i’s and j’s yields another mapping M 
such that:  
 Operation 3: The mapping M solves the exchange problem as: 
                                                                       M: ξ (p)  p.                                                               (8)  
M is in fact the monotone bijection performed by all consumers. That mapping is derived in detail in Dominique 
(2017), where it is shown that every one of its elements is a function of . The following conclusions can then be 
drawn:  
i) due to monotonicity, M contains a free variable, hence its rank is (n – 1);  
ii) ii) M-1 exists, M therefore is a monotone bijection; 
iii)  iv) if |.∣ stands for the cardinality of a set, then over the proper range |X∣= ∣∣;Type equation here. 
order is preserved as:  
                    im ij > mi  IJ +1 >,…, > Im ij +( n-1)     pj > pj + 1 >,…, > pj + (n-1), hence M is an order-isomorphism:                                            
iv) price is the metric of value, and:  
v) individual demand is relatively inelastic, then there is a tendency for prices to increase in the absence of 
a concomitant increase in supply.  
The free variable in M is what Walras identified as the numéraire. It remains to be seen after further studies, but it 
would appear that a mapping from an open ordinal space to another set leaves a variable free due the monotonicity 
of the mapping h4.  
It should also be noted that only one point on the individual demand curve is in fact observed. Therefore, the problem 
of aggregating individual demand curves analyzed by Sonnenschein (1973, 1974) and Mantel (1974) simply does not 
arise since the operation addition is mathematically defined. Of course, one could use the concept of price elasticity 
to reconstruct an ex-post demand curve, but what would be the use of that? 
In the end, this approach reveals that the dynamic process of exchange or the determination of value in economics 
reduces to consumers’ search for the mapping h, which incidentally is not observable except in equilibrium. Further, 
the approach subsumes the concept of revealed preference proposed by Samuelson (1938) and also shows that the 
criticisms addressed to revealed preference theory, namely whether consumers’ preference scale remains constant 
over time or not (see Wong, 1978) are not pertinent.   
CONCLUSION  
The present approach based on naïve set theory is conform to a scientific “démarche” because it is based on 
observables. The neo-classical approach, on the other hand, is based on ‘cardinalizing’ an ordinal space while 
imposing unrealistic demand on individual preference in an attempt to generate a utility function with a convex 
hypograph. It fails dramatically to reach its objectives.  Whereas the present approach based on naïve set theory uses 
real values to derive a proper individual and community demand curves. It also solves the market equilibrium as a 
stable sink, while establishing an unambiguous monotone metric for value.  
In sum, the utility trail requiring that mathematical operations be performed on ordinal spaces where they are not 
defined is not only a violation of mathematical rules, but it produces negative consequences. It fails to emphasize the 
reflexivity of markets. More importantly, it associates consumption with pleasure; as a result, we now have millions 
of individuals addicted to shopping. Moreover, the concept of maximization of an unobservable utility function 
(associated with pleasure) might be a bonanza for advertisers, but it is scientifically unjustified and it produces 
indebtedness, waste, and environmental degradation.     
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